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133 S.Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer,
J., concurring); see also Kristin E.
Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead,
83 Fordham L. R ev. 527, 541-45
(2014) (synthesizing several Breyer
opinions). Meanwhile, courts
continue to ponder without clear
resolution whether they should
consider legislative history or
substantive canons of construction at
Chevron step one or step two.
Nevertheless, at least in theory,
Chevron is not incompatible with de
novo review, with a reviewing court
turning to deference only if statutory
meaning cannot be readily determined. The Chevron Court expressly
called for “employing traditional
tools of statutory construction” to
ascertain congressional intent regarding statutory meaning, 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984). Arguably, therefore,
a reviewing court should only turn
to deference and the reasonableness
inquiry described as Chevron step
two if the statute in question is not
susceptible to interpretation using
those traditional methods. And many
opinions applying Chevron take
precisely that approach. See, e.g., FDA

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
It is fair to observe that judges
sometimes do not take a very thorough approach to evaluating statutory
meaning in approaching a Chevron
analysis. For just one recent example,
consider Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014), in which six
justices in concurring and dissenting
opinions criticized the plurality for
moving straight to the reasonableness
inquiry of Chevron step two simply
because a snippet of statutory text
seemed facially inconsistent.
But sometimes, too, statutory questions legitimately lack clear answers
no matter how attentive a court is to
text, history, and purpose. At that
point of statutory ambiguity, courts
have naught else to do beyond either
nakedly choosing their own policy
preferences or assessing whether the
agency’s choice seems reasonable.
Many judges are uncomfortable, and
rightly so, with the former option.
Indeed, the late Justice Scalia’s
description of Chevron review in
Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J.
511, is entirely consistent with this

view—contending that Chevron’s
inquiry into statutory meaning should
include all of text, history, and even
some amount of policy evaluation,
but acknowledging that sometimes
judges are wise to acquiesce to the
judgment of administrative agencies.
The difficulty is and always has been,
whether under Chevron or otherwise,
ascertaining when and under what
circumstances such judicial acquiescence is appropriate.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court
could do much more than it has to
reconcile Chevron review with the
text of APA § 706. Given Chevron’s
malleability, such reconciliation
seems at least theoretically plausible,
whether or not APA § 706 more
explicitly calls for de novo review
of legal questions. Until Congress
starts writing clearer statutes (which
seems difficult if not impossible)
or instructs and convinces courts
to make their own policy choices
in the face of statutory ambiguity
(which seems highly unlikely),
judicial deference is here to stay.
The proposed Separation of Powers
Restoration Act will accomplish
little if anything, so why bother?
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f passed, the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act would require
federal courts conducting judicial
review of agency action to decide
“de novo all relevant questions of
law, including the interpretation of
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see, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the
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Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can
and Should be Overruled, 42 Conn. L.
R ev. 9 (2010), and also have misgivings about Auer deference, I fear
that the proposed Act goes too far in
completely eliminating deference to
agency legal determinations.
In testimony before the Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust
Law subcommittee of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, from
which these comments are drawn, I
have advocated for a more moderate
solution that would encourage courts
to apply the factors articulated in

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944), to determine how much, if
any, deference should be afforded to
agency legal determinations. Pursuant
to Skidmore, agency interpretations
deserve deference when the agency
has thoroughly considered the question, when its reasoning makes good
sense and when its views have been
consistent (and thus not shifting with
the political winds).
Before returning to the substance
of my proposal, it is appropriate to
point out that the characterization of
deference to agency legal determinations as a violation of separation of
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powers is misguided. While it may
appear that judicial deference to
agency legal decisions is inconsistent
with fundamental notions of the
judicial role, as embodied in Marbury
v. Madison’s famous statement that
“it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,” 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803), judicial deference to agency
legal determinations in most contexts
involving judicial review does not
implicate separation of powers for
the simple reason that there is no
constitutional entitlement to judicial
review. Congress could constitutionally eliminate judicial review of
rulemaking and many adjudicatory
decisions, except in those situations
in which judicial review is required
to satisfy Article III concerns over
agency adjudication of private rights.
In light of the long tradition of
judicial consideration of agency
views when reviewing agency legal
determinations, The Separation of
Powers Restoration Act is too blunt.
It would not recognize situations
in which Congress intends that
reviewing courts defer to agency
legal determinations, for example
in highly technical or sensitive areas
in which Congress expects agencies
to clarify statutory ambiguities or
when Congress sometimes explicitly
indicates that an agency should define
a statutory term. Because there are
contexts in which Congress has
traditionally favored judicial deference to agency legal determinations,
the proposal would force Congress
to make explicit exceptions to its
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application or it would frustrate
Congress’s intent in such contexts.
Thus, while the proposal is a
laudable effort to dispel some of the
negative consequences and confusion
caused by the Chevron doctrine,
insofar as it would disable reviewing
courts from taking into account the
views of an administering agency on
questions of statutory interpretation
and make it difficult for Congress
to allow deference to administering
agencies when appropriate, it may go
too far.
In my view, it would be appropriate for Congress to craft legislation
in reaction to all of the problems
Chevron deference has caused without
totally ruling out judicial deference
to agency views on legal conclusions.
My suggestion is to add the following
language to APA § 706, after subsection 2(F):
Unless expressly required otherwise
by statute, the reviewing court shall
decide all questions of law de novo,
with due regard for the views of the
agency administering the statute
and any other agency involved in
the decisionmaking process.
Under this standard, courts would
apply the pre-APA Skidmore factors
for determining how much to defer
to agency interpretations, but they
would have f lexibility to shape the
deference doctrine to meet modern
concerns and legal doctrine.
The “due regard” language would
allow courts to calibrate the degree
of deference to the particular situation. There might be contexts in

which minimal to no deference is
appropriate; for example, where
Congress has expressed strong policy
preferences but in accidentally
ambiguous language. There may
also be statutory gaps that Congress
would expect agencies to fill in
accord with Congress’s intent rather
than by agency policy views. There
may be other contexts, however,
in which the language, structure,
and purposes of a statute indicate
that Congress expects reviewing
courts to defer to persuasive agency
reasoning concerning the proper
construction of a statute or statutory
gaps that Congress would have
wanted an agency to fill in line with
consistent administrative policy.
Concerns over excessive deference
would be met by application of the
Skidmore factors, informed by fidelity
to Congress’s expressed preference
for less deference than has been the
case under Chevron. The Skidmore
factors are good indications that the
agency has applied its expertise to
the matter and acted with due regard
to Congress’s intent underlying the
statute being construed.
In conclusion, while there is
no doubt that reform to Chevron
and Auer is needed, the proposed
Separation of Powers Restoration
Act goes too far in eliminating
judicial consideration of agency
views when reviewing agency legal
determinations. A more moderate
reform, perhaps in the form of reviving the Skidmore factors, would be
preferable.
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